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THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE IMPROVEMENTS TO




IT is generally agreed that the GATT system of settlement of trade
disputes has worked relatively well since its creation in 1948. Over the
years it has been improved on a number of occasions. However, today
most members of the GATF are of the opinion that further improve-
ments are necessary to make the system more flexible, efficient and
effective. The procedures should be strengthened and some of the
rules should be made clearer. In other words, there are shortcomings
in the system itself and in the way in which it is operated. A better
system of dispute settlement would eliminate other, less legitimate
methods of resolution of disputes, especially resort to "voluntary
restraints" agreements, "orderly marketing" agreements and unila-
teral action in the form of retaliatory measures in national trade legis-
lation. For these reasons, the members of the GATT decided to
review the rules and procedures of the dispute settlement process and
to appoint a Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, at the Uru-
guay Round of negotiations that began at Punta del Este on 15 Sep-
tember 1986. In 1988 this group proposed a number of improvements
which served as a basis for those which the Trade Negotiations Com-
mittee, meeting at Montreal on 9 December 1988 at the ministerial
level, recommended for approval by the Contracting Parties' on a trial
basis.
The purpose of this article is to describe very briefly the existing sys-
tem of dispute settlement and, in the light of criticisms addressed to it,
examine the new improvements.
* Professor of International Business Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University, Toronto.
1. When the members of the GATT act collectively they are referred to as Contracting
Parties in italics.
(1989) 38 I.C.L.Q.
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I. THE PRESENT SYSTEM
A. General Survey of the GA TT System
1. Relevant provisions
The GATT contains several articles, with clauses dealing with the
resolution of disputes.2 However, Articles XXII and XXIII supple-
mented by the 1979 Understanding Regarding Notification, Consul-
tation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance,3 and the 1982 Ministerial
Declaration on Dispute Settlement are the most important.4
2. Brief analysis of relevant provisions
(a) Consultations. Article XXII as amended in 1955 provides for con-
sultations with respect to any matter affecting the operation of the
GATT. Contracting parties are invited to solve their disputes by bila-
teral consultations and, if this fails, by the conciliatory intervention of
the Contracting Parties.5 This is the diplomatic solution. Although
working parties may be established under this Article, contracting par-
ties have resorted to this procedure on only ten occasions between 1948
and 1986.
The 1979 Understanding adds that contracting parties undertake to
respond to requests for consultations promptly and to attempt to con-
clude them expeditiously with a view to reaching mutually satisfactory
conclusions.
6
2. E.g. Arts.XIX (safeguards), XXVII (modification of schedules of concessions),
XXV.5 (waivers). For a complete list of the 19 clauses in the GATT which oblige the dis-
putants to resolve differences by consultations, see J. H. Jackson, World Trade and the
Law of GA TT (1969), p. 16 4 .The text of the GATT may be found in (1969) IV B.I.S.D.
3. (1978-79) B.I.S.D., 26th Supp. 210.
4. (1982) B.I.S.D., 29th Supp. 13. See also 1984 Decision which completed and clari-
fied the 1979 Understanding on certain questions and contains directives applicable on a
one-year trial basis especially with respect to a short roster of non-governmental experts
qualified to serve as panelists: Action by Contracting Parties on Dispute Settlement Pro-
cedures (1985) B.I.S.D., 31st Supp. 9.
5. (1955) B.I.S.D., 3rd Supp. 250. Art.XXII provides as follows:
"Consultation:
1. Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford
adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, such representations as may be
made by another contracting party with respect to any matter affecting the operation
of this Agreement.
2. The Contracting Parties may, at the request of a contracting party, consult with any
contracting party or parties in respect of any matter for which it has not been possible
to find a satisfactory solution through consultation under paragraph 1."
6. Para.4. Note that any contracting party requesting consultations under Art.XXII.2
must inform the Director-General of the GATT to allow notification of all other contract-
ing parties. 1958 Decision (1959) B.I.S.D., 4th Supp. 24.
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(b) Nullification or impairment. A contracting party may have
recourse to the procedures provided for by Article XXIII when it con-
siders that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under the
GATT is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objec-
tive of the GAT[ is being impeded as a result of:
7
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations
under this Agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether
or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation.
A presumption exists that a breach of the rules of the GATT has an
adverse impact on other contracting parties, and in such a case it is up to
the contracting party against which the complaint is made to rebut the
charge. 8 The object is to stop the violation of agreed-upon rules in order
to preserve the integrity of the GATT. Emphasis is placed on adjudi-
cation.
"If a contracting party bringing an Article XXIII case, claims that
measures which do not conflict with the provisions of the General
Agreement have nullified or impaired benefits accruing to it under the
General Agreement, it will be called upon to provide a detailed justifi-
cation." 9 The complainant must prove that a benefit accruing to it under
the GATT has been nullified or impaired. In this case the emphasis is
placed more on negotiation than on adjudication since no agreed-upon
rules are involved.
Bilateral consultations between the disputants under Articles XXII,"'
XXIII.1," or XXXVIII.2 and 512 in order to obtain a satisfactory
adjustment of the matter must precede recourse to the dispute settle-
ment procedures found in Article XXIII.2. Thus, when the contracting
parties are unable to resolve their dispute through consultation, negotia-
tion or conciliation,' 3 the aggrieved party1 4 may request the Council of
the GATT to appoint a panel to adjudicate such dispute. Although
there is no legal requirement, a request for the establishment of a panel
will usually be granted by the Council in accordance with "standard
practice" of the GATT, unless the request is opposed by the other
party.
7. Art.XXIII.1.
8. 1979 Understanding, Annex, para.5.
9. Ibid. Note that the concept of nullification or impairment is related to the expec-
tations of a contracting party.
10. 1960 Decision (1961) B.I.S.D., 9th Supp. 19.
11. 1979 Understanding, para.6.
12. Art.XXXVII deals with commitments to less-developed contracting parties.
13. 1979 Understanding, para.8.
14. Private persons have no standing under the GATT. They must act through their
governments.
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The use of the dispute settlement procedures must not be intended or
considered as a contentious act and all parties must engage in these pro-
cedures in good faith in an effort to resolve the dispute. 15
The panel, pursuant to its terms of reference, will investigate the dis-
pute in the light of the rules of the GATF, hear the arguments of the
parties concerned and make such findings as will assist the Contracting
Parties in making recommendations or rulings. 16 Since the 1982 Minis-
terial Declaration on Dispute Settlement was made, no more than 12
months have elapsed between the decision of the Council to establish a
panel and its adoption of the panel report. On average, panels have
completed their reports within six months. 17 In cases of urgency, the
panel should deliver its report within three months following its estab-
lishment.
18
It is always possible for the parties to the dispute to reach a settlement
before the panel submits its report to the Council, in which case it is the
end of the matter. 19
The panel may,20 if nullification or impairment is found, recommend
that the offending measure be withdrawn, 2' or if this cannot be done
immediately, that the injured party be compensated, for instance by
lower tariffs until the withdrawal takes place.2 2 The report containing
the findings and recommendations or rulings must be given prompt con-
sideration and approval by the Council which is empowered to act on
behalf of the Contracting Parties in order to acquire legal force. 23 Adop-
tion of the report and action taken pursuant to it within a reasonable
period of time are decided by consensus.24 Thus, any contracting party,
including the party which is the object of the recommendations or rul-
15. 1979 Understanding, para.9. The function of Art.XXIII.2 is to encourage the par-
ties to settle their dispute.
16. Idem, para.16.
17. Idem, para.20: the time required by panels varies with the particular case. Also
1982 Ministerial Declaration on Dispute Settlement, para.(vi). The panels are composed
of three to five independent experts agreed upon by the parties to the dispute or selected
by the Director-General: 1979 Understanding, para.ll; Annex, para.6(iii). Also 1984
Decision. The panel's composition and terms of reference must, in principle, be deter-
mined within 30 days following the decision to establish it.
18. 1979 Understanding, para.20.
19. Idem, para.17. The report of the panel may be confined to reporting that a solution
has been reached.
20. Idem, Annex, paras.3 and 6(viii); 1982 Ministerial Declaration on Dispute Settle-
ment, para.(v).
21. Idem, Annex, para.4. Note that idem, paras.2 and 3 provide for publication and
notification of trade measures possibly in advance of implementation. Thus, if the
measures were to violate GATT obligations, a dispute could be avoided before it arose by
consultations leading to the withdrawal of the measures.
22. Idem, Annex, para.4.
23. Idem, Annex, para.1, fn.1.
24. 1982 Ministerial Declaration on Dispute Settlement, para.(x).
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ings, can block the adoption of the report. However, obstruction in the
process of dispute settlement must be avoided.2 5 Consensus does not
mean unanimity especially in view of Article XXV.4 of the GATT,
which states that, except as otherwise provided, decisions of the Con-
tracting Parties are taken by a majority of the votes cast.
The Contracting Parties will keep under surveillance any matter on
which they have made recommendations or rulings to make sure that
implementation takes place within a reasonable period of time. 26 If the
recommendations or rulings are not implemented, the aggrieved con-
tracting party may seek the authorisation of the Council to take retalia-
tory action against the offending party.27 Usually, this means the
suspension, on a discriminatory basis, of the application of concessions
vis-dt-vis the other member country concerned in order to restore the
negotiated balance of rights and obligations under the GATIT:
If the application to any contracting party of any concession or other obli-
gation is in fact suspended, that contracting party shall then be free, not
later than sixty days after such action is taken, to give written notice to the
Executive Secretary to the Contracting Parties of its intention to withdraw
from this Agreement and such withdrawal shall take effect upon the six-
tieth day following the day on which such notice is received by him.
28
As stated by one authority:
29
One of the basic objectives of any dispute procedure in GATT has been
the effective resolution of the dispute rather than "punishment", or
imposing a "sanction" or obtaining "compensation". The prime objective
has been stated to be the "withdrawal" of a measure inconsistent with the
General Agreement.
Today, in spite of the progressive codification of the basic procedures
for the settlement of disputes by third party adjudication, consultations
and conciliation leading to an amicable settlement through diplomatic
negotiations are still preferred by the contracting parties. Thus, the
major characteristic of the GAT system of settlement of disputes is the
conciliatory character of the procedures. The objective is to redress
25. Ibid.
26. 1979 Understanding, para.22; 1982 Ministerial Declaration on Dispute Settlement,
para.(viii).
27. GATT, Art.XXIII.2; 1979 Understanding, para.22; Annex, para.4. This has hap-
pened only once between 1948 and 1988 when in 1952 the Netherlands was authorised to
impose a discriminatory quota on imports of wheat flour from the US following a dispute
regarding US quotas on dairy products. The Netherlands did not retaliate: (1955)
B.I.S.D., 3rd Supp. 46. Note that the authorisation may be blocked under the consensus
rule.
28. GATT, Art.XXIII.2.
29. Jackson, op. cit. supra n.2, at p.184.
[VOL. 38
OCTOBER 1989] The GA TT Dispute Settlement Rules
the contractual balance of rights and obligations between the disputants
in particular and among the contracting parties in general.
3. Developing countries
In 196630 the Contracting Parties adopted a decision, confirmed in
1979, 3 1 which establishes the procedure to be followed for consultations
and conciliation between developed and developing contracting parties.
This procedure provides, inter alia, for the Director-General of the
GATT to employ his or her good offices with a view to facilitating a
solution, for setting up a panel with the task of examining the dispute or
problem in order to recommend appropriate solutions, and for time
limits for the carrying out of the different parts of this procedure.
If the dispute is not resolved through consultations and conciliation,
either party to it may refer the matter to the Contracting Parties.
3 2
4. Statistical data with respect to complaints and their disposal
Statistical data compiled by the GATT Secretariat 33 indicates that, in
practice, most disputes concerning the interpretation or implementation
of the GATT are settled through bilateral consultations without involv-
ing the Contracting Parties. This explains why between 1948 and 1986
only 104 complaints were made that formally invoked Article XXIII.2.
Also, in some instances the contracting parties brought their disputes to
the attention of the Council without reference to this provision.
Fifty-two of the 104 complaints resulted in the submission of a report
by a panel. Of these reports 50 were adopted or led to a mutually satis-
factory solution and hence a withdrawal of the complaint, or in two
cases were implemented without adoption. It is only in two cases that
the panel reports did not result in the resolution of the dispute. The
other 52 complaints were settled during sessions of the Contracting Par-
ties, by working parties, by groups of experts or through bilateral con-
sultations before the panel had met.
34
In 1987 seven panels were established and in 1988, 14. This recent
increase in resort to the dispute settlement procedures of the GATT
30. (1966) B.I.S.D., 14th Supp. 18.
31. 1979 Understanding, paras.7-8. Annex, paras.2-3.
32. 1982 Ministerial Declaration on Dispute Settlement, para.(i).
33. This amounts to a 2.5 per year average. This section is based on FOCUS, GATT
Newsletter, May 1987, No.46, p.2, Status Report End of 1986.
34. For a survey, see also R. E. Hudec, "Legal Issues in US-EC Trade Policy: GAIT
Litigation 1960-1985", in R. E. Baldwin, C. B. Hamilton and A. Sapir (eds.), Issues in
US-EC Trade Relations (1988), p. 17 .
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seems to indicate that the contracting parties have more confidence in
the quality of the work of the panels.
B. The Tokyo Round Codes
The non-tariff barriers agreements negotiated in the Tokyo Round also
contain procedures for the settlement of disputes which apply only to
GATT members having signed them. Some of them follow more or less
the model of the 1979 Understanding. 35 Others adopt new and more
elaborate and rigorous procedures. 36 Still others establish specific pro-
cedures although reference is made to Articles XXII and XXIII of the
GATT.37 Finally, some are without detailed procedures.38
The procedures are operated by the committee administering the
agreement concerned. For instance, it is provided in the Code on Sub-
sidies and Countervailing Duties that when a signatory believes that any
subsidy granted or maintained by another signatory either causes injury
to its domestic industry, nullification or impairment of benefits accruing
to it under the GATT, or serious prejudice to its interests, such signa-
tory may request consultations with such other signatory. In the event
that no mutually acceptable solution is reached, the next step is concilia-
tion mediated by the administering committee. Only then has the
aggrieved party the right to a proceeding before a panel. The adminis-
tering committee upon receipt of the panel report may make
recommendations to the parties and if they are not followed within a
reasonable period of time, authorise appropriate counter-measures.
Strict time limits apply to each phase of the dispute settlement pro-
cedures. 9
The dispute settlement procedures of the codes have been used spar-
ingly. Between 1979 and 1986 three reports presented by panels estab-
lished under the Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties were not
adopted because they raised fundamental questions concerning the
interpretation of certain articles of this code, on which the committee
disagreed.40
35. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (Standards Code); Agreement on
Government Procurement; Agreement on the Implementation of Article VII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Code of Customs Valuation).
36. Agreement on Interpretation of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties); Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Revised
Anti-Dumping Code).
37. Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft; Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures.
38. Bovine Meat Arrangement; Dairy Arrangement.
39. Arts.12, 13, 17, 18.
40. Quoted from loc. cit. supra n.33. Note that if disputes arise between the parties
relating to rights and obligations under the Revised Anti-Dumping Code, the parties
should complete the dispute settlement procedures under the Code before availing them-
selves of any rights which they have under the GATT: Art.15, fn.14.
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C. Criticisms of the Present System
Dissatisfaction with the GATT procedures 4' for the settlement of dis-
putes results from a number of causes, especially the lack of automatic
access to panels, delays in appointing them and in establishing their
terms of reference, slow consideration of the cases due to the absence of
strict time limits for the various stages of the procedure, an inadequate
panel selection process, often a lack of competent and neutral panelists
and the poor quality of panel reports. Decision-making by consensus,
which allows blockage by the losing party, and difficulties and delays in
implementing panel reports are also undermining the system.
A better system of surveillance to ensure compliance with
recommendations and rulings is needed which ultimately depends upon
the political will of GATT members to abide by the rules for the settle-
ment of disputes. The lack of recourse available to the losing party has
also been criticised.
Since the practice of the GATT has been to stress conciliation and
negotiated settlements rather than the enforcement of obligations,42
recommendations or rulings are made only when the parties are unable
to reach a mutually acceptable solution to their dispute. However, in
recent years, especially since the DISC case,4 3 the contracting parties
seem to become more committed to the adjudicative process.
A more legalistic and rule-orientated procedure for the settlement of
disputes would discourage the breach of the GAIT rules, result in more
precise decisions on the merits of disputes, and ensure greater com-
pliance with them than does the present consensus system. Negotiated
settlements favour countries that have considerable political and eco-
nomic strength irrespective of the merits of the dispute. An adjudicative
41. For detailed analysis see e.g. R. E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World
Trade Diplomacy (1975), Adjudication of International Trade Disputes (1978), and
"GATT Dispute Settlement After the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished Business" (1980) 13
Cornell Int. L.J. 145; W. J. Davey, "Dispute Settlement in GATIT" (1987) 11 Fordham
Int. L.J. 51; K. R. Simmonds and B. H. Hill, Law and Practice under the GA TT (1988); J.
C. Bliss, "GAT'T Dispute Settlement Reform in the Uruguay Round: Problems and Pros-
pects" (1987) 23 Stan. J. Int. L. 31; 0. Long, Law and its Limitations in the GATT Multi-
lateral Trade System (1985); E. McGovern, International Trade Regulation: GATT, The
United States and the European Community (1986); US International Trade Commission,
Review of the Effectiveness of Trade Dispute Settlement under the GA TT and the Tokyo
Round Agreements (1985); K. Dam, The GA TT: Law and International Economic Organ-
ization (1970).
42. Long, idem, p.71: "In any proceedings, the Contracting Parties' main objective is to
produce recommendations designed to protect this balance rather than have recourse to
sanctions."
43. (1975-76) B.I.S.D., 23rd Supp. 98; J. H. Jackson, "The Jurisprudence of Inter-
national Trade: The DISC Case in GATIT" (1978) 72 A.J.I.L. 747; R. E. Hudec,
"Reforming GATT Adjudication Procedures: The Lessons of the DISC Case" (1987-88)
72 Minn. L. Rev. 1443.
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approach stresses fairness and is more likely to protect the rights of
small countries.
Perhaps greater use should be made of retaliation which, so far, has
meant the re-establishment of the balance of concessions and advant-
ages between the contracting parties concerned. Retaliatory measures
should take the form of legal sanctions when the GAIT rules have been
broken. 4 Unfortunately, a small country, especially if it is a developing
country, has a limited capacity to retaliate against a major trading
partner that fails to implement a panel recommendation.
The lack of agreement among the contracting parties on the nature of
the panel rulings, whether they are binding on the parties to the dispute
and constitute a precedent that can be relied upon in future disputes,
has not enhanced the authority of the panels.
Although no one questions the view that the present system should be
strengthened and made more effective, improvements will not be fully
successful so long as some of the members of GATT are dissatisfied with
the substantive rules adopted at Tokyo, especially with respect to sub-
sidies. It is the lack of more rigorous substantive rules that has resulted
in a strain on the legal remedies.
Of the many suggestions that have been made to improve the present
system, the following should be mentioned: a mechanism for early
warning; notification to the Council of mutually agreed solutions where
any GATT member could raise matters relating to such solutions; pro-
vision for going directly to the Council and requesting a panel should the
other party fail to respond to a request for consultations within an estab-
lished time period; the enhancement of the consultation, mediation and
conciliation process, especially mediation by the Director-General; new
options such as voluntary or mandatory binding arbitration to respond
to the different nature of disputes, provided the rights of third parties
are not affected; automatic access to panels; strict time limits for the
Council when establishing panels; the creation of a permanent tribunal
of legal experts or the holding of regular meetings of the Council
devoted exclusively to dispute settlement; the use of standard terms of
reference by panels; the expansion and the regular updating of a roster
of non-governmental panelists; the imposition of strict time limits on the
work of panels and the examination and implementation of their reports
44. Note that the GATI obligations could be enforced by resorting to traditional reme-
dies under international law. However, the practice has been "to rely mainly upon the
provisions of GAIT itself for legal redress in cases of violation or other disputes", Jack-
son, loc. cit. supra n.2.
45. See R. E. Hudec, " 'Transcending the Ostensible': Some Reflections on the Nature
of Litigation Between Governments" (1987-88) 72 Minn. L. Rev. 221. According to the
US International Trade Commission, op. cit. supra n.41, the difficulties are not due to any
serious defects in the dispute settlement mechanism per se but to the lack of political will
on the part of the litigants to abide by GATT decisions.
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by the Council; the modification of the consensus rule, especially with
respect to the adoption of the panel reports by the Council, by excluding
the parties to the dispute from the decision-making process; the avoid-
ance of differences of interpretation of the GATT rules by the panels; a
more important role for the Secretariat and its legal staff; a better qual-
ity of government participation; an improved follow-up procedure; a
clarification of the procedure in disputes involving several complainants;
and the right of intervention of third parties, including access to
information. Would their participation complicate and prolong the
settlement of a dispute? In other words, should the right to make a com-
plaint continue to be restricted to the countries directly concerned or be
broadened?
Lastly, it has also been proposed that a special and more favourable
treatment should be accorded to developing countries which would
include specialised legal assistance, supplementary training courses and
post-consultation review by the Council, so long as these measures do
not infringe the principle of equality of treatment.
III. THE IMPROVEMENTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
A. Introduction
According to the Ministerial Declaration of 15 September 1986 signed at
Punta del Este, the negotiating objectives of the Uruguay Round are as
follows:
4 6
In order to ensure prompt and effective resolution of disputes to the bene-
fit of all Contracting Parties, negotiations shall aim to improve and
strengthen the rules and the procedures of the dispute settlement process,
while recognising the contribution that would be made by more effective
and enforceable GATT rules and disciplines. Negotiations shall include
the development of adequate arrangements for overseeing and monitor-
ing of the procedures that would facilitate compliance with adopted
recommendations.
From its inception, the Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement was
confronted with a large number of proposals made by the participating
countries for the improvement of dispute settlement rules and pro-
cedures.4 7 These proposals enabled the, Group to identify certain
important issues for negotiations and to prepare the list of improve-
ments that was submitted to the Trade Negotiations Committee meeting
at the ministerial level in December 1988.
46. (1987) B.I.S.D., 33rd Supp. 19; GATT Newsletter, Jan.-Feb. 1987, No.43, p. 6 .
47. For some of these proposals see preceding section.
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The text adopted at the ministerial meeting48 begins with a declara-
tion that the GATT dispute settlement system serves to preserve the
rights and obligations of the contracting parties. It is a central element in
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system.
Existing rules and procedures will continue to be enforced but the
improvements are to be applied on a trial basis only, from 1 May 1989 to
the end of the Uruguay Round, in respect of Articles XXII and XXIII.
The application of these improvements will also be kept under review
during the remainder of the Round for the purpose of deciding on their
permanent adoption. Meanwhile the Negotiating Group on Dispute
Settlement will continue its work for the full achievement of the nego-
tiating objectives.
B. Notification
Mutually agreed solutions to matters raised under Articles XXII.1 and
XXIII. 1 as well as arbitration awards within the GATT must be notified
to the Council where any contracting party may raise any point relating
thereto.
C. Consultations
A contracting party to which a request is made for consultations under
Article XXII.1 or XXIII.1 must, unless otherwise mutually agreed,
reply to it within ten days after its receipt and enter into consultations in
good faith within a period of no more than 30 days from the date of the
request, with a view to reaching a mutually satisfactory solution. If the
requested party does not respond within ten days, or does not agree to
enter into consultations within a period of no more than 20 days or any
other period otherwise mutually agreed, from the date of the request,
the complaining party may then proceed directly with a request for the
establishment of a panel or working party. The purpose of this provision
is to accelerate the procedures for the settlement of disputes when the
offending party is not interested in reaching an amicable solution. If the
consultations under Article XXII.1 or XXIII.1 fail to settle a dispute
within 60 days after the request for consultations, the complaining party
may request the establishment of a panel or working party under Article
XXIII.2. This may also be done earlier if the parties jointly consider
that consultations have failed to settle the dispute.
Any request for consultations must be in writing, contain the reasons
for the request, and be notified to the GATT Council. Shorter time
limits are set in cases of urgency.
48. MTN.TNC/7 (MIN), 9 Dec. 1988, pp. 26- 33 .
OCTOBER 1989] The GA TT Dispute Settlement Rules
D. Good Offices, Conciliation, Mediation
Good offices, conciliation and mediation are voluntary procedures that
may begin and be terminated at any time. The Director-General may,
acting in an ex officio capacity, offer his or her services with the view to
assisting the contracting parties to settle a dispute. This is important
when developing countries are involved.
E. Arbitration
Although originally the GATI system did not provide for arbitration,
the contracting parties to certain disputes that essentially concern issues
that are clearly defined by them may now agree to settle them by
expeditious, binding arbitration. The arbitration agreement must con-
tain a selection of the arbitral procedure and be notified to all GATT
contracting parties sufficiently in advance of the actual commencement
of the arbitral process. One must assume that the procedure to be
chosen by the parties could be governed by the 1985 UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 49 or more likely
the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 50 There is no'need for a choice
of law clause since the arbitration tribunal must apply the relevant
GATT provisions.
The possibility of resorting to binding arbitration is one of the more
interesting features of the improvements. It opens up new possibilities
although one must not be over-optimistic since the panel system already
operates as a quasi-arbitral tribunal. Although it is regrettable that the
text does not provide for compulsory arbitration in some cases, this is
understandable for it would have amounted to a major change in the
GATT system of settlement of disputes for which the contracting parties
were not ready.
Will the arbitration be ad hoc or will it be institutional? In the latter
case, will it be administered by the GATT Secretariat exclusively or
could it be administered by the International Chamber of Commerce,
the American Arbitration Association or some other similar arbitral
institution?
Other contracting parties are not affected by an arbitration and retain
their rights under the GATT. However, they may become party to it
upon the consent'of the original parties.
Although the arbitration award does not require the approval of the
Contracting Parties, it is probable that a party failing to implement the
award will have to make compensation or face retaliation. Should
the arbitral tribunal be limited to the remedies provided by the GATT
49. (1985) 24 I.L.M. 1302.
50. (1976) 15 I.L.M. 701.
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or should it be able to award damages? How and where would a monet-
ary award be enforced against a losing party?
F. Panel and Working Party Procedures
The improvements made to the panel and working party procedures
successfully remedy several of the criticisms addressed to them.
If the complaining party so requests, a decision to establish a panel or
a working party must be taken at the latest at the Council meeting fol-
lowing that at which the request first appeared as an item on its regular
agenda. The ministers did not give the contracting parties a legal right to
a panel.
Standard terms of reference are applicable unless the parties to the
dispute agree otherwise. Panels shall be composed of well-qualified
governmental or non-governmental individuals or both. In this connec-
tion the roster of non-governmental panelists is to be expanded and
improved. In principle, a panel is composed of three members, unless
the parties to the dispute agree within ten days from the establishment
of the panel, to a panel composed of five members. If there is no agree-
ment on the members of the panel within 20 days of its establishment,
each party may request the Director-General in consultation with the
Chairman of the Council to form the panel. 5' These procedures do not
differ greatly from those followed by arbitral institutions. They may ren-
der GAIT arbitration less attractive especially if the adoption and
implementation of recommendations and rulings are made more effec-
tive.
Special procedures are adopted for multiple complainants. Thus, a
single panel may be established to examine several complaints related to
the same matter.
Provision is also made for third party practice. Any third contracting
party having a substantial interest in the matter before a panel, and hav-
ing notified this to the Council, shall have an opportunity to be heard by
the panel and to make written submissions to it. The panel may also
grant the third contracting party access to the written submissions to the
panel by those parties to the dispute which have agreed to the disclosure
of their respective submissions to the third contracting party.
With respect to the various phases of a panel, it is recommended that
the panels follow the suggested working procedures found in the July
1985 Note of the Office of Legal Affairs, unless the members of the
panel agree otherwise after consulting the parties to the dispute. As a
general rule, the period in which the panel shall conduct its examination
from the time the composition and terms of reference of the panel have
51. Ten days shorter than previously. See 1984 Decision, para.3.
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been agreed upon to the time when the final report is provided to the
parties to the dispute, shall not exceed six months and, in cases of
urgency, the panel shall aim to provide its report within three months as
is the case pursuant to the 1979 Understanding. 52 Since panel pro-
cedures should provide sufficient flexibility to ensure high-quality panel
reports while not unduly delaying the panel process, no compulsory
time limits are fixed. However, it is stated that in no case should the
period from the establishment of the panel to the submission of the
report to the contracting parties exceed nine months. This is stronger
language than that found in the Annex to the 1979 Understanding.53
G. Adoption of Panel Reports
In order to provide sufficient time for the members of the Council to
consider panel reports, such reports shall not be considered for adoption
until 30 days after they have been issued to the contracting parties. Dur-
ing that time the disputants may still be able to settle their differences.
Contracting parties having objections to a panel report must give writ-
ten reasons to explain their objections for circulation at least ten days
prior to the Council meeting where the report will be considered.
On the controversial question of consensus, it is reiterated that the
parties to a dispute have the right to participate fully in the considera-
tion of the panel report by the Council and that their views shall be fully
recorded. Panel reports are still to be adopted by consensus without
prejudice to the GATT provisions on decision-making which remain
applicable. However, the parties to .a dispute shall not avoid delaying
-the process of dispute settlement. The ministers shied away from declar-
ing that the parties to a dispute may either join or abstain from the con-
sensus or even be excluded from it. Thus, blocking of remedial
measures is still possible.
The period from the request under Article XXII.1 or XXIII.1 until
the Council makes a decision shall not, unless the parties agree other-
wise, exceed 15 months.
H. Technical Assistance
The technical assistance services of the GATT Secretariat in respect of
dispute settlement are available to any contracting party requesting
them. Legal advice and assistance by a qualified expert within the Tech-
nical Co-operation DiVision may also be obtained by any developing
contracting party. Training courses for interested contracting parties
52. Para.20.
53. Para.(x).
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concerning the GATT dispute settlement procedures and practices will
be conducted by the Secretariat.
L Surveillance of Implementation of Recommendations and Rulings
Prompt compliance with recommendations and rulings of the Contract-
ing Parties under Article XXIII.2 is declared to be essential in order to
ensure effective resolution of disputes. There is an obligation on the
part of the contracting party concerned to inform the Council of its
intention in respect to implementation of the recommendations or rul-
ings. If that party finds it impracticable to comply immediately with the
recommendations or rulings, it shall have a reasonable period of time in
which to do so.
The Council shall monitor the implementation of recommendations
or rulings. Thus, unless the Council decides otherwise, this issue shall be
on the agenda of the Council meeting after six months following the
adoption of the recommendations or rulings and shall remain on the
agenda until it is resolved. Also, at least ten days prior to each such
Council meeting, the contracting party concerned shall provide the
Council with a status report in writing of its progress in the implemen-
tation of the panel recommendations or rulings. The purpose of these
improved procedures is to encourage the losing party to remove the
offending measure as promptly as possible.
The ministers did not settle the issues of the definition, determination
and types of compensation should the offending party fail to implement
the recommendations or rulings, nor did they consider the amount of
impairment that could serve as a guide to negotiate compensation or as
a basis for the suspension of concessions or other obligations. Panels
should be able to recommend the payment of damages as a form of com-
pensation. The determination of the date from which the calculation of
the amount of impairment is to be made is another important question.
Perhaps these issues will be dealt with by the Negotiating Group on Dis-
pute Settlement before the end of the Uruguay Round.
IV. CONCLUSION
THE improvements of the GATT dispute settlement rules and pro-
cedures are very modest and to some extent of a cosmetic nature. They
do not evince a definite political commitment to settle trade disputes by
these new rules and procedures and to abide by the results. This is made
clear by the refusal to adopt the "consensus-minus-two" rule. Panel
decisions are not yet fully binding and enforceable. Emphasis is still
placed on a flexible system of negotiated settlements and consensus.
The most important innovations are the adoption of arbitration as an
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alternative means of dispute settlement and the shorter time limits
applicable to the various phases of a panel. Much remains to be done in
the future. A truly adjudicative and legalistic system of settlement of
disputes is not yet in sight.
